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David MacMichael was a CIA Central America intelligence analyst from 1981 to 1983. A codirector of the Institute for Media Analysis Nicaraguan Election Project, he visited Nicaragua
four times in 1989. MacMichael plans to return to Nicaragua in February to monitor the voting
and the immediate aftermath of the election. Reproduced below is a recent interview by the
Washington-based Nicaragua Network (from 01/30/90 report). NN: How would you describe US
government strategy in this election, in contrast to that of 1984? MacMichael: After the installation
of the Bush administration and the decision that the contra approach had failed and would not
be continued, Washington went for the political strategy for overthrowing the Sandinistas. In my
view, the assumption this political strategy was based on was that in any fair electoral contest, the
Frente Sandinista would be defeated, largely because of the very difficult economic situation. All
that was required was to put together a unified opposition, fund it, and provide it with sufficient
direction. Washington expected that one of two things would happen: either...a reasonably fair
electoral contest would produce a win by the US-supported opposition, or the Frente Sandinista,
convinced it would lose, would prevent a fair electoral process and thus delegitmize itself. The
second expectation would of course call for new policy decisions by the US you can imagine what
those might have been. This expected scenario was different from the US strategy in 1984 which
was to boycott the elections from the very beginning. `Candidate' Arturo Cruz who was being
paid over $6,000 a month by the US government at that time was withdrawn after supposedly
not finding conditions right for free elections. US propaganda at the time held that `marxistleninists' never hold elections, they maintain one-party states. But then the Nicaraguan government
moved ahead of the previously announced schedule to hold elections in 1984 on a multi- party
basis. It was in Washington's interest to disrupt and destroy the process completely and to push
the boycott... Washington had every reason to believe at that time that the Frente would win the
elections. This time the strategists in Washington thought the Frente would lose the elections,
so the effort is made to have a maximum participation. NN: What do you think about the US
assumption that the FSLN was unpopular and would lose this time around? MacMichael: The
US government and the opposition were disabused of this notion by a couple of things. First,
the Nicaraguan government successfully responded to the economic crisis early 1989. That the
government succeeded in bringing hyperinflation under control was a considerable achievement.
From a political point of view, the fact that they were able to impose austerity measures and obtain
the cooperation of the people, instead of the kind of violent responses [to austerity] that we saw
throughout the rest of Latin America, was a clear indication of the government's strength... The
second indication of the Frente Sandinista's popularity was the massive show of support during
the tenth anniversary celebration. The opposition and the US had been hoping that few people
would attend the Revolution anniversary events. Thousands of campesinos celebrated the agrarian
reform by attending anniversary events carrying their precious land titles... NN: What has been
the US response? MacMichael: During the massive July 19 celebration the Frente made the point
that they had defeated the contras and brought peace, and it was now time to move forward. At
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the beginning of August you once again see large numbers of contras infiltrating into Nicaragua
from Honduras...This did not happen by accident, but was specifically designed to take the peace
issue away from the FSLN, and reestablish insecurity within large areas of the countryside. The
objective of such behavior by the contras at the direction of the US...was to shake the confidence
of the country in peace: the message given by the contras reinfiltrating into Nicaragua is, `As long
as the Sandinistas are here, you will never have peace, and we will always be coming back.' The
second result hoped for by the US was that in response to the contra infiltration, the Nicaraguan
government would crack down on the opposition, and adopt unpopular steps, such as reintroducing
military conscription. The [US strategy] finally climaxed in October with the ambush and murder
of the 18 young reservists returning to their hometowns to register to vote. The Nicaraguan
government, under considerable internal pressure from its own supporters, finally had to announce
the end of its unilateral cease-fire. Once again, the US propaganda barrage: the US Congress did
not condemn the contras for murdering 18 young people, but rather the Nicaraguan government for
taking steps to pursue the killers. This led, as predicted, to the continuation of contra aid, which was
to have been reviewed in November. NN: What effect has bringing the contras back into the country
had inside Nicaragua? MacMichael: As a strategy to boost the prospects of UNO, the reinfiltration
of the contras has backfired. One thing it has accomplished is to saddle UNO ever more firmly with
the burden of the contras. What you have is [contra military leader and former Somocista Guard
colonel Enrique] Bermudez issuing statements of firm support for UNO, contras spreading UNO
propaganda, and UNO refusing in any way to put itself firmly on the side of [contra] demobilization.
That this has hurt UNO can be seen in several ways. The recent Greenberg-Lake poll showed: 1)
the major negative for UNO is its association with the contras, and 2) there is extraordinarily strong
support for the Frente vis-a-vis UNO in the conflict zones (60% pro-Frente, and only 24% for UNO).
NN: Has UNO been effective? MacMichael: We have just a few weeks to go until the Nicaraguan
elections. The major organizational and directive efforts of the US in putting UNO together have
been completed. And now, as is usual in our experience with Nicaraguan opposition groups,
the US is holding UNO together and trying to paper over the weaknesses which went unnoticed
when Washington began its plan. This phenomenon was reflected during voter registration in
October. To a certain extent UNO failed the test, because they showed their lack of grassroots
organization in not being able to get enough fiscales [poll watchers] out to all the registration sites.
The FSLN continues to be unified, and its grassroots organization is good. The FSLN works on
the street level, while UNO relies heavily on US advice, such as from the National Endowment
for Democracy (NED). UNO wasted two weeks bickering about more access to television, and
meanwhile it fails to manage putting up even a few banners over the street. UNO relies on its
outside resources; the FSLN necessarily relies on its internal resources. There are two types of
political discussion that go on about Nicaragua. One type is a discussion geared for a US audience
which essentially knows nothing about Nicaragua and is easily bamboozled. The second level of
discussion goes on for Nicaraguans who, at all levels, are extraordinarily well informed in detail
about what goes on in their country. The NED has had problems in successfully directing political
discussions to a Nicaraguan audience because the NED is used to a type of political direction that
is geared to a 60- second sound bite, and the manipulation of non-issues such as flag-burning,
which is not appropriate or effective in a country like Nicaragua. NN: Will the US pull UNO and
Violeta Chamorro out of the race, in an attempt to bring about a repeat of what happened in 1984
when Cruz was pulled from the race? MacMichael: That is certainly an option the US is seriously
considering. Cruz's withdrawal from the election in 1984 had a major impact here in the US and
among members of the Congress (who will believe anything). But nobody here in the US is voting in
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the Nicaraguan election. The many international observers will make a big difference this time. This
is one of the reasons the Frente exerted itself as it did, over a great deal of opposition by the US, to
ensure that large numbers of international observers are present throughout the electoral process.
Here in the US, the White House can get away with doing anything it wants. But in Nicaragua,
pulling UNO out would really discredit the political opposition inside Nicaragua. From the point
of view of projecting UNO as a continuing, long-term opposition to the Sandinistas, and to the
Revolution, I think [pulling UNO out of the election] would be a very serious mistake on the part
of the US. The opposition was discredited by its withdrawal in 1984. Arturo Cruz has no role to
play in Nicaraguan politics at all; he's been thoroughly discredited. NN: How would the US set
the stage for pulling UNO from the race? MacMichael: If that option is adopted, then you might
see some spectacular act of violence designed to discredit the electoral process and provide the
pretext for Violeta quitting the race. I have suspicions that the anti-FSLN propaganda by the NEDfunded Center for Democracy after the incident at Masatepe [an UNO rally which turned violent]
was designed to be part of an UNO pull-out. If that was the intent, it has fallen flat in Nicaragua.
The observers from the OAS confirmed that it was impossible to tell how the violence started, but
UNO came ready to do battle this was not a spontaneous riot. The US argument after the expulsion
of US diplomats from Nicaragua [after US troops entered the Nicaraguan ambassador's residence in
Panama] can be seen as a partial preparation for pulling UNO out of the election. The US line is that
expelling the diplomats diminishes Washington's ability to monitor the fairness of the elections. By
the way, one of the US diplomats expelled from Nicaragua was Valentin Martinez, principal advisor
to UNO. His departure is arguably a blow to US direction of the UNO campaign. Despite the recent
Congressional intelligence authorization limiting the CIA's activities inside Nicaragua, the CIA
is quite capable of spreading rumors and stimulating violence if they want to justify having UNO
quit the race. NN: Will the election go forward? What are the most likely outcomes? MacMichael:
The probability is that the election will go forward on February 25, and that the Frente will win.
If it's a very close election, one can look for the maximum utilization of ways to throw the official
results into dispute, such as the use of the supposedly non-partisan Via Civica's exit polling system,
which was put in place with NED money. The US definitely hopes to cast doubt on the results. In
any case, I don't see UNO being good losers. If the Frente wins, the internal question afterwards
is how does UNO develop into a long-term, responsible, political opposition? There are many
possibilities. For example, if the control of major cities passes into the hands of the opposition, it will
be a whole new ball game. There is the much less likely case of the UNO winning, which nobody
has begun to think about. Waiting in the wings are contras Bermudez, Aristedes Sanchez, and the
rest of those people who have been saying, `The Sandinistas must be tried for their crimes and taken
out and shot.' NN: What will the US do after the elections? MacMichael: In the very likely event
of a Sandinista victory legitimated by international observation groups, the US will face a policy
choice as to how it is going to relate to Nicaragua over the next six years. In my view the most likely
immediate reaction is that the administration will say it is `reviewing' its policy options and will
make no change. Do not look for the embargo to be lifted, nor for any other significant change. The
question essentially becomes one of whether the policy will be...a Chilean model during the Allende
years with an intensification of pressures. This has very little possibility of success in Nicaragua,
because the US cannot control the Nicaraguan military. The more likely circumstance is that for
a period of time there will be a US policy of "malign neglect." The US will continue as far as it is
able...to influence its major allies to withhold and limit the amounts of credit both directly and
through the multilateral lending agencies, and to keep their markets closed to Nicaragua if possible.
Congress can't do a thing about the embargo unless it stirs and takes extraordinary action, which
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is not very likely. NN: And the contras? MacMichael: Come February there is going to be a fake
demobilization in Honduras: a highly public demobilization of essentially the sick, lame and lazy
among the contras. They will turn in a fair number of arms in Honduras, dismantle the camps, and
make preparations for resettlement and repatriation of these individuals. There will be others who
will have simply taken a hike on their own as they do now, into Honduras or elsewhere. There will
be a certain number who will join families in Key Biscayne. There is also going to be at this time,
as there is now, a second wave of infiltration going on. Such process can be described as a phony
demobilization of people who are going to come into Nicaragua, stash their weapons somewhere,
and go back to the farm. And then there's going to be a very small group, maybe something like 500,
who are going to stay in the mountains somewhere for as long as they can. I've seen this process
before in different parts of the world. I don't think there will be, regardless of the electoral results,
another appropriation for the contras. There will be, for certain, support for limited contra activity
out of CIA contingency funds. But beyond that, it will be one of those things that you don't pay that
much attention to anymore. NN: Any concluding thoughts? MacMichael: Due to the slowing of the
contra war, we have already seen a `peace dividend' in Nicaragua with a cut in the defense budget
in the context of a reduced overall budget , from close to 60% to less than 35% of the total. There are
plans for a further reduction. Nicaragua can expect some increased aid from international sources,
although aid from the USSR is in question, particularly in terms of oil. There will be a "government
of reconciliation" in Nicaragua after the elections, that is, some significant posts will be held by
opposition party members. The economic program based on a search for cooperation between all
sectors of society, and offering guarantees to private producers will continue. There are many in
the private sector who have been holding their breath for the elections they can't afford to do that
anymore. They are going to have to start working with the government. In sum, not everything that
happens in Nicaragua is a function of what the US does or wants.

-- End --
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